The Interpersonal Basis of Self-Stereotyping

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Members of stereotyped groups live in a social world in which cultural stereotypes often influence the way others see them and behave toward them (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). One consequence of this state of affairs is that stereotype targets are regularly in the position of interacting with other social actors who hold, or are perceived to hold, stereotypical attitudes about their group. Classic perspectives on the social basis of self-understanding such as symbolic interactionism suggest that self-stereotyping (i.e., application of cultural stereotypes to the self) is an unavoidable consequence of these stereotype-tinged social interactions (e.g., Allport, 1954; Cartwright, 1950; Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). According to these approaches, the self is derived from internalization of the way peoples' social interaction partners view them. In this analysis, stereotype targets simply absorb cultural beliefs about their group into their own self-concepts whenever they interact with individuals who subscribe to these stereotypic beliefs. Because stereotypes pervade society, this analysis suggests that self-stereotyping is a highly prevalent, perhaps ubiquitous, phenomenon. Our research takes a decidedly different approach to understanding the social basis of self-stereotyping. Although we agree that self-stereotyping can be a product of one's social relationships, our research suggests that it is far from unavoidable. Rather, self-stereotyping is situation specific and contingent on the perceived views of salient social interaction partners and the desire to get along with them.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE SELF

Psychologists recognized long ago that the individuals people interact with shape self-understanding. Specifically, symbolic interactionists argued that intersubjectivity with those around us was a critical element in the development and maintenance of self-understanding (see Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Stryker & Statham 1985 for reviews). For example, Mead (1934) proposed that self-concepts are formed and continually regulated by adopting the perspectives others have about the self. Similarly, Cooley (1902) contended that self-understanding is

predicated on the way individuals think others understand them. In essence, these theorists argued that self-evaluations were situationally constructed such that they corresponded with the evaluations of others.

Recent research on relational schemas (Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996) and transference (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Chen & Andersen, 1999) renewed focus on the interpersonal basis of self-understanding. According to these approaches, self-evaluations are shaped by the perceived views of individuals with whom one has developed a long-term significant relationship. Influenced by research on social cognition, they posit that aspects of the self become associated with significant others. When reminded of a given significant other, self-evaluations corresponding to the way one typically behaves with that person come to the forefront of working memory, thus dictating how people see themselves at that moment.

Our research is motivated by shared reality theory (Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996), which unites classic perspectives' focus on intersubjectivity, modern research on communication (e.g., Higgins, 1992; Krauss & Fussell, 1996), and social cognitive underpinnings. Shared reality theory suggests that all social beliefs, including beliefs about the self, are situationally derived via intersubjectivity with other social actors. Specifically, this perspective contends that social bonds and social beliefs are maintained through perceived consensus or "shared reality." The establishment of specific shared realities in particular social interactions both creates social bonds and structures understanding of the world. In other words, social beliefs are established and maintained to the degree that social interaction partners are thought to share them. In addition, social bonds are established and maintained to the degree that participants in social interactions believe they have achieved mutually shared understanding of relevant beliefs and experiences (Hardin & Conley; Hardin & Higgins).

Affiliative social tuning hypothesis

These basic assertions yield two hypotheses that guide the research discussed in this chapter. First, because achieving shared reality is thought to create social bonds, it follows that people should experience a heightened need to develop shared reality with another social actor to the extent that they are motivated to get along with this person. One way for individuals to achieve this is to "tune" their social beliefs, including beliefs about the self, toward the views of the other person when affiliative motivation is high. We refer to this as the affiliative social tuning hypothesis.

Although our research on self-stereotyping is the first to expressly test the affiliative social tuning hypothesis with respect to self-evaluations, there is evidence of affiliative social tuning of other social beliefs (e.g.,

Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Davis & Rusbult, 2001; McCann & Hancock, 1983; McCann & Higgins, 1992). For example, Higgins & McCann (1984) found that the descriptions of an individual provided by people who valued positive interactions with superiors (i.e., "high authoritarians") corresponded with the ostensible views of a high status audience, but not a low status audience. In other words, these individuals experienced attitude convergence with superiors, whom they care about, but not inferiors, whom they do not care about. Sinclair and colleagues (2004b) also found that even automatic attitudes about others were subject to affiliative social tuning. We showed that people who interacted with a likable experimenter shifted their automatic ethnic attitudes toward the experimenter's ostensible attitudes, but people who interacted with a rude experimenter did not experience commensurate attitude shift (see also Lowery, Hardin & Sinclair, 2001).

Domain relevance hypothesis

In every day social interaction, individuals that engender high affiliative motivation may espouse many social beliefs. Drawing on the communication literature (Higgins, 1992; Krauss & Fussell, 1996), shared reality theory also provides some guidance as to which of these beliefs is most likely to form the basis of one's attempts to create shared reality via social tuning. One source of this guidance is the domain relevance hypothesis. It states that a social belief that is under negotiation will respond to the other social actor's view that is most local or specific to it. For example, one could know another person's views of people in general, people from your town and you as an individual. Although each of these views is potentially relevant to the self, attempts to achieve shared reality regarding the self with that person should entail adjusting to her views about you as an individual, as doing so yields the best chance of creating mutual understanding. The less precise match between the self and what this person thinks of people in general or people from your town has greater potential for slippage. If this person thinks you are different from the aforementioned groups, adjusting the self to conform to her beliefs about these groups will actually violate her expectations, decrease mutual understanding, and likely make the social interaction less pleasant (Krauss & Fussell; Orive, 1988).

One can see the critical role of intersubjectivity with others that characterized classic perspectives on the social basis of the self, such as symbolic interactionism, in the notion of social tuning presented in these hypotheses. Individuals are thought to adjust beliefs that are relevant to important social interactions (including beliefs about the self) to the ostensible beliefs of other people involved in these interactions to achieve shared reality, the state of perceived mutual understanding (i.e., intersubjectivity). However, unlike recent perspectives on the social basis of

the self that focus on the role of significant others in constructing one's self-understanding, our perspective suggests that both significant others and novel social actors who are the object of situationally derived affiliative motivation can elicit social tuning. From this perspective, the phenomenological sense of a stable self that most individuals enjoy is a product of two things: stable environmental and motivational input. People experience the self as stable because they tend to interact with similar types of people (Andersen, Reznik & Manzella, 1996), frequent similar types of environments, and hold long-term social roles (e.g. occupational, familial) that structure their interpersonal interactions.

The potential for dramatic flexibility of implicit and explicit attitudes as a function of the perceived views in one's interpersonal context and affiliative motives proposed by shared reality theory is predicated on connectionist models of mental representation (Smith, 1996). Connectionist models suggest that information is not contained in inert nodes; but rather, distributed across an array of processing units connected by unidirectional links. A given mental state is a pattern of activation across these units and links that best fit the amalgam of current input. As such, all mental representation is highly flexible and dependent on immediate experiences, motives, etc. Thus, classic notions of intersubjectivity dynamically structuring social beliefs feasibly combine with modern notions of cognitive representation.

THE INTERPERSONAL BASIS OF SELF-STEREOTYPING

Given that stereotypes are widely shared cultural beliefs that influence how stereotype targets are evaluated (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Stangor & Lange, 1994), and stereotype targets are well aware of that fact that stereotypes may influence how they are perceived (Crocker, et al., 1998), it is likely that stereotypes targets face a great many situations in which they must interact with individuals who hold, or are presumed to hold, stereotypes of their group. How does being subject to this predicament affect the way in which stereotype targets see themselves? The affiliative social tuning hypothesis and the domain relevance hypothesis make clear predictions regarding the impact of this predicament. According to the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, the stereotype-relevant evaluations of others will translate into self-evaluations and corresponding behavior when affiliative motivation is high as opposed to low. In other words, stereotype targets' self-evaluations will become more stereotype consistent when they possess high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward another social actor perceived to hold stereotype consistent attitudes about their social group. In contrast, stereotype targets' self-evaluations will become less

stereotype consistent when they possess high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward another social actor believed to hold stereotype inconsistent attitudes. The domain relevance hypothesis suggests that once individuals' stereotype-relevant self-evaluations are under negotiation, they will tune to the beliefs that are most closely related to them. In other words, if someone is privy to another social actors' stereotype-relevant views of members of their social group and of them as individuals, that person's self-evaluations should tune to the social actor's views of themselves as individuals because these beliefs are more relevant to the self than are beliefs about members of the group to which one belongs, and are therefore more likely to create mutual understanding.   In the remainder of this chapter we will discuss several experiments that examine the veracity of these predictions.

Affiliative social tuning experiments

To examine the affiliative social tuning hypothesis we manipulated whether participants believed their interaction partner held stereotype consistent or inconsistent attitudes of their social group in three experiments. We also manipulated (Experiments 1 & 3) or measured (Experiment 2) participants' affiliative motivation toward that person. In each of these experiments, we found clear and consistent support for our predictions (see Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2004a for a more detailed presentation of these results).

In Experiment 1, we tested the affiliative social tuning hypothesis with respect to self-stereotyping on gender-relevant traits. Eighty-three participants (50 women and 33 men) participated in the experiment. Participants were greeted by a female experimenter and informed that the experiment concerned the transmission of rumors. Participants then completed a brief demographics questionnaire; among the questions was an item asking when their birthday was. At this point, participants were assigned to one of two affiliative motivation conditions. We employed a two-fold manipulation of affiliative motivation based on previous work (Griffitt, 1968; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998). Participants were told that they were going to have a relatively long interaction with someone who happened to share their birthday (high affiliative motivation) or a short interaction with someone whose birthday differed from theirs (low affiliative motivation).

After this, participants were told they would read some information allegedly completed by the other participant in order to give participants some information about this person. This information constituted the manipulation of the ostensible group attitudes of the interaction partner (always female). Embedded within this packet of information was a questionnaire entitled "Attitudes about women" that was designed to convey to participants that their imminent social interaction partner had stereotype consistent or inconsistent attitudes about

women. For example, in the stereotype consistent condition, the questionnaire indicated that her social interaction partner strongly agreed with the statement "Women should be cherished and protected by men." In contrast, in the stereotype inconsistent condition, her partner purportedly agreed with the statement "Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination."

After being given time to peruse the questionnaire, participants were informed that they would complete several questions about themselves that their partner would also have the opportunity to view. The dependent measure in this experiment was the degree to which participants rated ten traits stereotypically associated with women (calm, caring, compassionate, faithful, attractive, sensitive, sweet, sad, shy, weak) and nine traits stereotypically associated with men (athletic, competitive, confident, outspoken, intelligent, strong, aggressive, arrogant, insensitive) as indicative of the self on this questionnaire. To create an index of stereotypicality of self-evaluation, we transformed each item into a z-score within gender, separately averaged the female and male traits, and created a difference score by subtracting the stereotypically male traits from the stereotypically female traits. Higher numbers indicated self-evaluations that were more consistent with the cultural stereotype of females.

If the affiliative social tuning hypothesis is correct, we should have found that female participants' self-evaluations were more stereotype-consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward an interaction partner who was believed to hold stereotype-consistent attitudes about their group. The opposite pattern of self-evaluations should have emerged when the interaction partner was believed to hold stereotype inconsistent attitudes; such that, female participants' self-evaluations were less stereotype-consistent when they had high versus low affiliative motivation toward their interaction partner. Furthermore, we did not expect male participants to evidence similar shifts in self-evaluation because their interaction partner's attitudes about *women* were less germane or relevant to their self-views.

To test these predictions, we ran a 2 (partner attitudes) X 2 (affiliative motivation) X 2 (gender) between participants ANOVA on participants' responses to the self-evaluation measure. As expected, the only reliable effect was a three-way interaction between partner attitudes, affiliative motivation, and participant gender, F (1, 75) = 6.11, p = .02, η^2 = .08. To more fully explore this three-way interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs on female and male participants' responses to the measure of self-evaluation.

First, as predicted and consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, the only effect to emerge for female participants was a two-way interaction between partner attitudes and affiliative motivation, $F (1, 46) = 6.97$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .13$ (see Figure 1).


Figure 1. Female participants' stereotypicality of self-evaluations as a function of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes of an interaction partner in Experiment 1. Note: Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations.

As hypothesized, when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype consistent, women's self-evaluations were more stereotype consistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than low affiliative motivation toward that partner ($p = .04$, one-tailed). The opposite pattern of self-evaluations was found when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype inconsistent; women's self-evaluations were more stereotype inconsistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than low affiliative motivation ($p = .03$, one-tailed). Furthermore, investigation of male participants' responses yielded no reliable main effects (both $p's > .13$) and the interaction between partner attitudes and affiliative motivation did not reach significance, $p = .29$.[1]

In a second experiment, we sought to provide further support for shared reality theory's affiliative social tuning hypothesis and to gain leverage against a self-presentation explanation of these results (e.g., Jones & Pittman, 1982; Zanna & Pack, 1975). In an attempt to decrease any self-presentational concerns, participants were told that the measure of self-evaluation would not be viewed by their interaction partner and was simply for "our records." Furthermore, in Experiment 2 we had female participants ($n = 75$) actually interact with a confederate. We expected

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[1] All simple effects tests were one-tailed due to strong directional hypotheses (Abelson, 1995).

that participants' behavior would also be subject to affiliative social tuning, with their behavior mimicking self-evaluations. Rather than experimentally manipulating affiliative motivation in Experiment 2, we took advantage of naturally occurring differences in the extent to which one wishes to form (or avoid) interpersonal relationships. To accomplish this, we measured participants' sense of loneliness or sense of being socially overburdened via two questionnaires. Participants were assigned to either a loneliness or social overburdened scale. From scores on these two scales, we created high (either lonely or not socially overburdened) and low (either not lonely or socially overburdened) affiliative motivation groups. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were informed that the experiment dealt with first impressions and they would get a chance to view some information about their interaction partner (always male) and would then get a chance to interact with this person. First, participants were given the opportunity to view their interaction partner's answers to a series of questions. This constituted the ostensible group attitudes of the interaction partner and was the same as that in the first experiment. Next, participants were given the measure of affiliative motivation discussed above. After participants completed this measure, the experimenter claimed that she forgot to have them complete a background questionnaire earlier in the experiment. This background questionnaire was for the experimenter's files and their partner would not view their answers to these items. The measure of self-evaluation was contained within this questionnaire. By making the measure of self-evaluation not tied to the interaction with their partner in any way (i.e., this person would never view their answers), we sought to minimize participants' self-presentational concerns when completing this measure. The items that comprised this measure were similar to the series of stereotypically female and stereotypically male traits as those used in the first experiment. After completing these items, participants commenced with an unstructured interaction with their interaction partner, actually a male confederate blind to experimental condition. Following the interaction, the confederate rated the stereotypicality of participants' behavior, with higher numbers indicating greater stereotype-consistent behaviors than stereotype inconsistent behavior enacted during the course of the interaction. Predictions for both participants' behavior and self-evaluation were the same as those in Experiment 1.

To test these predictions, we conducted a 2 (partner attitudes) X 2 (affiliative motivation) between participants ANOVA on participants' behavior as rated by the confederate. The only reliable effect to emerge from this analysis was the predicted interaction between partner attitudes and affiliative motivation, $F(1, 64) = 6.15$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .09$ (see Figure 2). Consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, when the interaction partner's

ostensible attitudes about women were stereotype consistent, participants' behavior was more stereotype consistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than low affiliative motivation toward that partner ($p = .04$, one-tailed).   This pattern was reversed when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype inconsistent, with participants' behavior being more stereotype inconsistent in the high affiliative motivation condition than the low affiliative motivation condition ($p = .05$, one-tailed).   In addition, we replicated the same pattern of self-evaluation as that found in Experiment 1 (Interaction, $F (1, 71) = 5.88$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .08$).   Consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, when the interaction partner's ostensible attitudes about women were stereotype consistent, participants' self-evaluations were more stereotype consistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation ($M = .165$) than low affiliative motivation ($M = -.244$) toward that partner ($p = .05$, one-tailed). This pattern was reversed when the ostensible attitudes of the interaction partner were stereotype inconsistent, with participants' self-evaluations being more stereotype inconsistent in the high affiliative motivation condition ($M = -.266$) than the low affiliative motivation condition ($M = .172$) ($p = .04$, one-tailed).


Figure 2. Stereotypicality of participants' behavior as a function of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes of an interaction partner in Experiment 2. Note: Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent behaviors.

In Experiment 3, we wanted to generalize these findings to another stereotyped group (e.g., African Americans, $n = 29$), another type of stereotype relevant self-view (i.e., academic self-evaluation), and gain further leverage against a self-presentation explanation of previous results. Because the predominant stereotype about African Americans is that they are intellectually inferior (Devine & Elliot, 1995), this allowed us to set up a situation in which we could pit two motives against one another. To do this, we created a situation in which participants competed to gain entrance into a prestigious academic team and earn a monetary prize. If strategic self-presentation

is guiding participants' responses, then we should find inflated academic self-evaluations in all conditions since this situation calls out for a maximization of academic self-evaluation to make the team and get the money. In contrast, if participants are guided by affiliative social tuning, we should find academic self-evaluations varying as a function of affiliative motivation and perceived stereotypicality of partner attitudes regardless of whether this would thwart entrance into the team and lessen chances to win the monetary prize. More specifically, we predicted participants' academic self-evaluations would be lower (i.e., consistent with stereotypes of African Americans) when they had high versus low affiliative motivation toward a person who was perceived to hold stereotype consistent attitudes about their group. In contrast, we expected participants' academic self-evaluations to be higher when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward someone believed to have stereotype inconsistent attitudes about their group. Some broad conceptions of self-presentation do not limit themselves to postulating that self-presentation only occurs to make one appear positive (e.g., Schlenker, 2003); however, these perspectives are unable to predict which of the aforementioned self-evaluative responses would occur.

The general procedure was as follows. Participants were led to believe that they were competing for a slot on a prestigious academic team and a monetary prize. We manipulated level of affiliative motivation by telling participants that the person who selected team members (high affiliative motivation) or another prospective member of the team (low affiliative motivation) was next door, would view their materials, and they would later interact with this person. After being told this information, participants were informed that prior to interacting with this person, they would be given some information about him. This constituted the manipulation of ostensible group attitudes. In one case, this person was described as an economics major who liked classic rock, played golf, and wanted to be a corporate lawyer (stereotype consistent attitudes condition). In the other condition, this person was described as a sociology major that liked hip-hop music, volunteered at a local charity, and wanted to be a civil rights attorney (stereotype inconsistent attitudes condition).   The same picture of a European American male accompanied both descriptions. Other generic information common to both descriptions was used to lessen suspicion and to flesh out the descriptions. Pre-testing determined that African Americans would indeed assume the former person to have more stereotype-consistent views than the latter person. After hearing the descriptions, participants were handed a questionnaire containing the main dependent measure and informed that their answers to this questionnaire would be used to determine entrance onto the academic team. The dependent measure was Steele and Aronson's (1995) 3-item measure of academic investment. The items were: "How would you rate your overall academic ability?" (1 =

not good at all to 7 = *very good*), "How much do you value academics?" (1 = *not very much* to 7 = *very much*), and "How important are academics to you?" (1 = *not very important* to 7 = *very important*), α = .77. To be consistent with the two previous experiments, we reverse-scored participants responses to each item, transformed participants' responses to each item into z-scores, averaging all three to create an index of self-evaluation, with higher numbers representing more negative, academic self-evaluations than lower numbers.

To test these predictions, we submitted the measure of academic self-evaluation to a 2 (partner attitudes) X 2 (affiliative motivation) between participants ANOVA. As can be seen in Figure 3, the predicted interaction was obtained, $F (1, 23) = 7.25$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .24$, controlling for participants math and verbal SAT. In support of shared reality theory's affiliative social tuning hypothesis, we found that when participants believed their interaction partner held stereotype consistent attitudes of African Americans, their academic self-evaluations were more negative (i.e., more stereotype consistent) when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him ($p = .06$, one-tailed). This pattern of academic self-evaluations is striking given that participants actually rated themselves as less academically talented to the very person who would be choosing members of the academic team. In addition, the opposite pattern of academic self-evaluations emerged when the ostensible attitudes of this person were stereotype inconsistent.   In this case, African Americans' academic self-evaluations were higher (i.e., less stereotype consistent) when participants had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him ($p = .02$, one-tailed).


Figure 3. African Americans' academic self-evaluations as a function of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes of an interaction partner in Experiment 3. Note: Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations.

Across all three experiments, two stereotype targets, two manipulations of ostensible group attitudes of another social actor, and various manipulations (and measures) of affiliative motivation we found strong and

consistent evidence for the veracity of the affiliative social tuning hypothesis. In sum, we found that stereotype targets' self-evaluations and behavior varied as a function of affiliative motivation and the perceived stereotype relevant attitudes of their interaction partner. What these experiments demonstrate is that the self-stereotyping is neither unavoidable nor simply the direct result of stereotype targets internalizing the beliefs of those people with whom they interact. Social interactions can act to promote self-stereotyping or to attenuate self-stereotyping.

Furthermore, it seems that participants' self-views were genuinely changing as opposed to simply being strategically presented to make a positive impression. First, in Experiment 2, participants' responses on the self-evaluation measure were completely confidential and would not be viewed by their interaction partner, minimizing the extent to which participants would be motivated to engage in strategic self-presentation. Second, Experiment 3 directly pitted strategic self-presentational goals against affiliative social tuning goals. In this experiment we created a situation in which participants, if guided by self-presentation, should have presented themselves in a positive light across all conditions to accomplish the goal of attaining entrance onto the academic team and the monetary reward associated with entrance on the team. However, this was not the case; participants' self-evaluations reflected processes of affiliative social tuning.

Domain relevance experiments: Self-stereotyping and exceptions to the rule

As discussed earlier (see also Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004), an additional unique prediction derived from shared reality theory is the domain relevance hypothesis (Hardin & Conley, 2001). This hypothesis suggests that when confronted with multiple applicable views upon which to construct a shared understanding with another person an individual will choose to social tune toward only those views that will lead to the development of the most precise shared understanding with this person. That is, they will choose the other social actor's belief that is most closely related to the belief under negotiation. This hypothesis can help us understand how stereotype targets contend with conflicts between how a person sees his or her group and how this person sees him or her as an individual. For example, stereotype targets may not always encounter a person who sees him or her through the lens of a group stereotype; rather, this person may see him or her as an exception to the rule, as being different from the rest of the members of a particular group (i.e., women, African Americans, etc.).

Perceivers are relatively adept at categorizing apparently stereotype disconfirming individuals as exceptions to the rule (e.g., Allport, 1954; Hewstone, 1994). What this suggests is that stereotype targets may encounter individuals in their social environment who, for whatever reason, see them as different from other

members of the group. This mismatch between group-individual attitudes could take many forms, with a person being seen as an exception to a more or less stereotypical image of the group, e.g., someone with traditional attitudes about women thinks a woman he is interacting with is agentic, or someone with non-traditional attitudes about women thinks a woman he is interacting with is quite communal. These individual level perceptions need not be data-driven in any fashion or correspond to how a person actually sees him or herself. For example, a person may erroneously conclude that Jane is quite a good leader based on company rumor or some random first encounter he has with her at the company softball game last weekend.

How will a stereotype target (i.e., a woman) respond to this discrepancy? One possibility is that the attitudes about the group will exert more influence on a woman's self-evaluation than attitudes about her as an individual. For example, to the extent that being seen as different from her gender group makes a woman feel distinct from this valued social identity, this feeling of distinctiveness may then motivate a need to re-affirm that identity. One means of accomplishing this goal would be to see oneself as highly similar to the group (i.e., self-stereotype; Pickett, et al., 2002). In addition, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987) implies that simply making a particular social identity and the stereotypes associated with this identity salient may induce stereotype consistent self-evaluation (Hogg & Turner, 1987).

Although either of these alternatives is possible, shared reality theory proposes a decidedly different resolution to these group-individual mismatches. Based on the domain relevance hypothesis, it is expected that a person will seek to develop shared reality about the self based on the attitudes most closely related to the self available within a particular social interaction. In this case, although both this person's individual and group attitudes are potentially applicable to the self, the individual level attitudes about the self represent the most local or domain specific views upon which to construct her self-evaluation with this person. Social tuning to the group level attitudes would not serve her goal to develop shared reality about the self with this person, given that these are inconsistent with how this person specifically views her. Such mismatch would not facilitate the development of shared reality or social bonds with this person (see Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004 for a detailed discussion of the domain relevance hypothesis).

In Experiments 4 and 5, we (Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004) tested the domain relevance hypothesis by examining the affiliative social tuning of women's self-evaluations in response to being confronted with group-individual mismatches of another social actor's attitudes and the level of affiliative motivation present within the

interaction. Affiliative motivation was manipulated by varying whether the participant was in a position of low power (high affiliative motivation: they were being chosen, or not chosen, by a male confederate to become members of an interesting discussion group), or equal power (low affiliative motivation: the male confederate was simply a research assistant of no consequence to participants) in relation to another person. To manipulate the group attitudes of another social actor, we created a situation in which participants ostensibly overheard a conversation between a male confederate and a female experimenter, in which the confederate made a series of comments about women in general and a series of comments about participants in particular that either matched or mismatched his attitudes about women in general.

In Experiment 4 ($n = 65$), the confederate's attitudes toward women were *stereotype-consistent* across all conditions and we varied whether his attitudes about participants matched or mismatched these group attitudes. In Experiment 5 ($n = 47$), the confederate's attitudes toward women were generally *stereotype-inconsistent* and he then expressed attitudes about participants that matched or mismatched these attitudes. In both experiments, we predicted that participants' self-evaluations would social tune toward their social interaction partner's attitudes about them in particular, regardless of whether these conflicted (i.e., group-individual mismatch conditions) or corresponded (i.e., group-individual match conditions) to this person's attitudes about their gender group, when affiliative motivation was high as opposed to low toward this person.

The basic procedure across Experiments 4 & 5 was as follows. Participants were recruited under the guise that they were participating in a group discussion screening process. The discussions were described as fun, with free food and drink, and a monetary prize raffled off to those who made it into the discussions. A female experimenter who informed participants that they would be completing two questionnaires greeted them. She told them that first questionnaire would be used to determine entrance into the discussions and the second would be used to give the researchers more information about participants and would only be viewed if participants became members of the discussion.

As this was being said, participants could hear typing through a slightly ajar door directly to the right of where they were seated. Participants could hear but not see what was occurring in this adjacent room. After informing participants about what they would be doing during the experiment, the experimenter said one of two things to participants in an offhand manner. This was our manipulation of affiliative motivation. In the high affiliative motivation condition, the female experimenter informed participants that Matt, the discussion leader, was

entering previous participants' responses to the first questionnaire into a computer and would be making his decisions as to who would get into the discussions later in that day. In the low affiliative motivation condition, participants were told that Matt was a research assistant entering previous participants' responses to the first questionnaire into a computer for the discussion leader. The discussion leader would be in later that day to make his decisions.

After this exchange, the experimenter handed participants the first questionnaire and went into the room with the male confederate who participants thought was named "Matt." In reality, this first questionnaire was bogus and the confederate's statements about participants in particular, to be discussed shortly, were supposedly based on participants' answers to this questionnaire. We were not concerned with how participants completed any of these items. After participants completed this questionnaire, the experimenter said she forgot to put together the second questionnaire and would be right back. The experimenter then went into the adjacent room with the male confederate, leaving the door ajar so participants could hear what was occurring in the room. Participants then overheard a conversation between the confederate and the experimenter in which the male confederate expressed stereotype consistent attitudes (Experiment 4) or stereotype inconsistent attitudes (Experiment 5) about women in general and then expressed attitudes about participants in particular that either matched or were in opposition to these group attitudes. For example, in Experiment 4 the confederate conveyed stereotype consistent attitudes about women in general by saying that the women in the previous discussion have been great because they don't take the lead, are sensitive to other's opinions, and don't state their own opinions. He then said that, based on the bogus questionnaire the participant just completed, he expected the participant to be just like the previous female participants or just the opposite.

After participants overheard this exchange, the experimenter returned with the second questionnaire, informed participants once again that their answers to these questions would not be viewed until after the discussions had occurred and only if they were chosen for the discussions. It should be noted that the conversation in no way suggested to participants that they were likely or unlikely to be chosen. This second questionnaire contained the measure of self-evaluation. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the degree to which a series of eight traits stereotypically associated with women (sympathetic, calm, caring, compassionate, feminine, verbally skilled, dependent, supportive) were indicative of the self, Experiment 4 $\alpha = .67$ and Experiment 5 $\alpha = .71$.

As before, these items were individually z-scored and averaged to form the measure of self-evaluation with higher numbers indicating more stereotype-consistent self-evaluations than lower numbers.

In both experiments, the design was a 2 (affiliative motivation: high, low) X 2 (partner attitudes: group-individual match, group-individual mismatch) between participants factorial.   In Experiment 4, when the confederate's attitudes about both women in general and individual participants were consistent with prevailing stereotypes, we predicted that participants' self-evaluations would be more stereotype-consistent when they had high versus low affiliative motivation toward this person, consistent with Experiments 1-3. In contrast, when the confederate's attitudes about women in general were consistent with prevailing stereotypes but his attitudes about individual participants were inconsistent with prevailing stereotypes, we predicted that participants' self-evaluation would be less stereotype-consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward this person. This finding would provide support for the domain relevance hypothesis.

In Experiment 4, the expected interaction between affiliative motivation and confederate attitudes was obtained, $F\,(1, 61) = 10.37$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .15$ (see Figure 4).


Figure 4. Self-evaluation as a function of confederate attitudes (group-individual match, group-individual mismatch) and affiliative motivation (Experiment 4). Note: Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations.

Consistent with predictions, and Experiments 1-3, when the confederate expressed attitudes consistent with prevailing stereotypes about women in general and individual participants, participants' self-evaluations were more stereotype consistent when they had high affiliative motivation as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him

(p = .03, one-tailed). Providing evidence for the domain relevance hypothesis, the opposite pattern emerged when the confederate's attitudes about individual participants conflicted with his attitudes about their group. Specifically, when participants were seen as exceptions to the rule (i.e., the confederate had stereotype inconsistent views of individual participants but stereotype consistent views of women in general), we found that participants social tuned their self-evaluations toward the individual level attitudes of the confederate. Participants' self-evaluations were more stereotype inconsistent when they possessed high affiliative motivation than when they had low affiliative motivation toward the confederate (p = .01, one-tailed). Consistent with predictions, participants social tuned toward the most local or specific set of self-relevant attitudes of the confederate, his attitudes about them as individuals.

In Experiment 5, we predicted that when the confederate expressed stereotype inconsistent attitudes about women in general and individual participants, participants' self-evaluations would be less stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward him, consistent with Experiments 1- 3. In contrast, based on the domain relevance hypothesis, we predicted the opposite pattern of self-evaluations when participants were seen as exceptions to the rule. Specifically, when the confederate was believed to have stereotype inconsistent attitudes about women in general, but have stereotype consistent attitudes about individual participants, we predicted that participants' self-evaluations would be more stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward the confederate. This is precisely what we found. In Experiment 5, as in Experiment 4, the only reliable effect was the predicted interaction, F (1, 43) = 5.38, p = .03, η^2 = .11. As can be seen in Figure 5, domain relevance hypothesis was again supported. Consistent with predictions, when the confederate expressed attitudes inconsistent with prevailing stereotypes about women in general and individual participants, participants' self-evaluations were less stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward this person (p = .04, one-tailed). Providing further evidence for the veracity of the domain relevance hypothesis, the opposite pattern of self-evaluation was found when the confederate expressed stereotype inconsistent attitudes about women in general but stereotype consistent attitudes about individual participants (i.e., he saw them as exceptions to the rule). In this case, participants' self-evaluations were more stereotype consistent when they had high as opposed to low affiliative motivation toward the confederate (p = .07, one-tailed). As in Experiment 4, participants social tuned toward those beliefs that would lead to the most local or

specific shared reality, this person's attitudes about them as individuals, disregarding this person's attitudes about their group.


Figure 5. Self-evaluation as a function of confederate attitudes (group-individual match, group-individual mismatch) and affiliative motivation (Experiment 5). Note: Higher numbers indicate more stereotype consistent self-evaluations.

Across both experiments, we found clear support for shared reality theory's domain relevance hypothesis. In each experiment, regardless of whether another social actor's ostensible attitudes about participants conflicted or coincided with this person's ostensible attitudes about their group, participants social tuned toward what they believed his attitudes about them were under conditions of high but not low affiliative motivation. Being seen as an exception to the rule does not motivate participants to see themselves in a manner consistent with how the group is perceived. Rather, participants' self-evaluations incorporate or social tune toward the most local or domain specific attitudes of another social actor, the person's attitudes about them as an individual; which in turn leads to the most accurate representation of the self as seen through this other person's eyes. While being seen as an exception to the (stereotypic) rule may act to insulate one's self-evaluation from the negative effects of broader stereotypes it could also have detrimental effects. For example, seeing certain women as exceptions to the rule may be used as a form of social control (Jackman, 1994) and allow men to maintain their stereotypic beliefs of women generally. Furthermore, being seen as an exception to the rule could also thwart women's attempts at social action by decreasing their sense of group identity and shared fate (Wright, 2001).

CONCLUSIONS

Our research uses shared reality theory as a framework to examine how the fundamental need to get along with others and the ostensible views of others intersect to lead members of stereotyped groups to view themselves, and behave, in line with cultural stereotypes. This research found support for the affiliative social tuning hypothesis which argues that the stereotype-relevant evaluations of others will translate into self-evaluations and corresponding behavior when affiliative motivation is high as opposed to low. It also found support for the domain relevance hypothesis that contends that a social belief under negotiation will respond to the other social actor's view that is most local or specific to it. These findings occurred across a number of operationalizations of affiliative motivation and perceived attitudes; in within-group and cross-group interactions; and for two types of stereotype targets, women and African Americans. As such, unlike perspectives highlighting the social basis of the self to suggest that the prevalence of cultural stereotypes makes self-stereotyping virtually ubiquitous and unavoidable, our research robustly demonstrates that self-stereotyping depends critically on the perceived views of one's social interaction partners and one's relationship to them.

Although research on self-presentation also finds fluctuations in self-evaluation as a function of affiliative motives (e.g., Schlenker, 2003; Zanna & Pack, 1975), we do not believe that these results can be simply attributed to self-presentation for several reasons. First, in Experiment 2 participants did not think that the other social actor would see their self-descriptions. Thus, if strategic self-presentation were driving the results, self-evaluative shift would not be warranted and should not have been found. Second, in Experiments 3 – 5 participants actually behaved in ways that likely reduced their chances of receiving social and financial rewards in order to enhance the likelihood sharing reality with the other social actor. In Experiment 3, participants actually described themselves as less intelligent when expecting to interact with someone who seemed to have stereotypic views of African Americans when that person had the power to select them for an academic team versus did not have power over them. In Experiments 4 & 5, women tuned their self-evaluations to a high powered person's views of them as individuals, consistent with the domain relevance hypothesis, even though this entailed saying that they were very different from women already doing well in the discussion group they were trying to gain entrance to. Theory and research on self-presentation cannot account for the pull of affiliative motivation over the rewards; if anything, most of the self-presentation literature implies that the rewards should have dictated the manner of self-evaluative shift (Jones & Pittman, 1982).

We also believe that behavioral confirmation cannot account for our findings. According to behavioral confirmation theorists, expectancy-confirming behavior is brought about by the biased behaviors of biased perceivers (for a review Snyder & Stukas, 1999). For example, perceivers may act less friendly towards a social actor they believe to be unattractive as opposed to attractive. The purportedly unattractive person then responds to this relatively sullen behavior in a commensurate way and, thus, fulfills the stereotype that unattractive people are not socially skilled (Snyder, Tanke & Berschied, 1977). However, participants only engaged in an actual social interaction in Experiment 2, and it is unlikely that the confederates in that experiment had systematic expectations because they were blind to condition. Given that participants were not subject to the biased behaviors of perceivers in the reported experiments, behavioral confirmation is unable account for our findings.

Other research from our lab has lead us to suspect that the affiliative social tuning effects occur, at least in part, because people are not labeling the beliefs of other social actors stereotyping and, therefore, are not bringing coping mechanisms discussed throughout this volume to bear (see Miller, in this volume; Swim & Thomas, in this volume). Participants do not predict that they will tune their self-evaluations to the stereotypic beliefs of another social actor when affiliative motivation is high; rather, they predict that they will become angry and their self-views will be immobile (Huntsinger & Sinclair, 2004). We have also found tuning effects as a function of a subliminal prime (Sinclair, et al, 2004a) and on implicit attitudes (Sinclair, et al, 2004b). Future research should discern whether noting that the beliefs of others are the product of stereotypes would reduce affiliative social tuning, as well as the mechanisms by which this reduction occurs.

The interpersonal basis of self-stereotyping described in this research poses a challenge for individuals who do not want to foster self-stereotyping among stereotype targets. It suggests that individuals need not hold, or overtly express, stereotypes to elicit self-stereotyping among stereotype targets. Stereotypes may influence the self-evaluations of a stereotyped person if he or she merely *believes* that the other social actor holds stereotype consistent views of their group, or of himself or herself as an individual, and high affiliative motivation toward this social actor is warranted. For this reason, it is not sufficient for individuals who wish to avoid influencing their social interaction partners in potentially detrimental ways to simply avoid endorsing stereotypes. They must also actively seek to convey that they do not harbor stereotypical views. This task is especially difficult given that stereotyped individuals can often detect implicit stereotypes and prejudices that their social interaction partners are unaware of holding and can not consciously ameliorate (e.g. Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner, 2002).

Our findings also pose a challenge for stereotype targets. It is imperative for them to be interpersonally distant from individuals that seem to hold stereotypic views of them in order to avoid self-stereotyping. This is an arduous task for several reasons. First, it is difficult to discern the views of others. This is particularly the case with respect to stereotype-relevant views because people are often motivated to appear as if they do not endorse stereotypes (or may genuinely experience themselves as not endorsing stereotypes) despite stereotypic attitudes that leak out via non-verbal channels and when the appropriate behavior is not clear (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). Thus, stereotype targets are faced with social interaction partners who say and believe one thing about themselves but subtly behave in a biased way. Second, although being vigilant to stereotyping is necessary to protect the self from the views of others, such vigilance has negative emotional and pragmatic costs as well (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999; Pinel, 1999; see Kaiser, in this volume). For example, Mendoza-Denton and colleagues (2002; this volume) found that African American students who are sensitive to race-based rejection were less comfortable during the transition from high school to college and experienced lower university grades. Third, many important life circumstances require successful interpersonal connections with individuals who are thought to hold stereotypic views. For example, it is hard to imagine that stereotype targets can be successful in work or educational settings without succumbing to the affiliative motivation inherent in interactions with supervisors, teachers, roommates or teammates – some of whom may be perceived as having stereotypic views. Moreover, the fundamental human need for social connection (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) may drive stereotype targets who are solos in their environment to experience affiliative motivation toward the people around them, regardless of their apparent stereotype-relevant views.

Although this research illuminates challenges for stereotype targets and their interaction partners, it also identifies situations in which stereotype targets may be protected from self-stereotyping. For example, this research suggests that minority group members should flourish in environments in which teachers, mentors, and important others clearly express counter-stereotypic beliefs at both the group and individual level (see also Inzlicht & Good, in this volume; Mendoza-Denton, Page-Gould, & Pietrzak, in this volume). It also suggests a psychological mechanism by which interactions with ingroup members bolster the self-esteem, self-evaluations and performance outcomes of stereotype targets (e.g., Allen, Epps, & Haniff, 1991; Allen, 1992; Davis, 1995; Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 1998; Jackman, 1994). Because individuals are likely to experience affiliative motivation toward proximal others (Festinger, Schacter & Back, 1950) and ingroup members are likely to have (or at least be presumed to have) less

stereotypic views of their group than outgroup members (Hamilton, 1981; Linville, 1982), benefits of ingroup contact may stem from social tuning toward the presumably counter-stereotypic views on ingroup members. It is interesting to note, however, that the social tuning mechanism can account for negative effects of ingroup contact as well (Fordham & Ogbu, 1986; Ogbu, 1986). This perspective suggests that contact with ingroup members should yield stereotypic self-evaluations and behavior when ingroup members are perceived as buying into stereotypes of their own group (Fordham & Ogbu; Jackman; Ogbu).

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